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ABSTRACT 
 
A wave of populism is certainly sweeping the world yet again. In Africa, the ugliest face of 
violent nationalism can be observed in South Africa, where regular spikes of xenophobia are an 
affront to the pan Africanist project that leaders on the continent have been trying to actualize for 
decades. This paper explores socio-economic, political, psychological, and cultural dimensions 
of the othering of the non-South African black, which are ultimately rooted in the fear of 
experiencing increased scarcity in an already economically infertile field for the low class, 
unemployed citizen. The paper attempts to propose a way forward that includes strengthening 
individual states on the continent and specifically addressing fear based behaviors. 
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Introduction 
The nation state is a relatively recent, yet incredibly powerful, concept. The notion that identity, 
belonging, and obligation begin and end at certain physical boundaries is peculiar when we take 
into consideration the perpetual movement of peoples over time. The places in which groups and 
individuals found themselves when certain borders were erected did not necessarily have any 
significant connection to their identity in the future, whether social, political, or economical. As 
much as nation states can serve as useful units of both organization and measurement for both 
human and economic development, they can also be tools for constructing divisive differences 
where they do not need to exist (Morse and Fraser 2005, 629). This is especially true in the 
context of Africa, where national borders drawn up at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 were 
not a function of the historical and practical groupings of people, but of the colonial agenda. 
Divvying up the continent also meant isolating chunks of the continent from each other in what 
is commonly termed a divide-and-conquer tactic. The pan Africanist movement at its core works 
to undo this sense of division. Instead, the goal of the movement is to harness the intellectual, 
social, political, and, eventually, economic strength that arises from unity (Hill 2015, 136). 
It is alarming that several nations continue to embrace divisive nationalism, populism, and a 
disdain for foreign nationals. The newly inaugurated Trump administration of the United States, 
that of Theresa May in the United Kingdom, and the possibility of a Marie Le Pen presidency in 
France are prominent examples. South Africa has also been guilty of holding nationalist and 
xenophobic sentiment for similar reasons, including a disenchantment with governments’ over-
promised allure of prosperity, complemented by the convenient scapegoating of foreign nationals 
for putting a so-called extra strain on national social and economic infrastructure. On multiple 
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levels, Africans are already victims of systematic discrimination worldwide. Prime examples 
come out of the neoliberal economic system, built on exploitative colonial foundations, which 
perpetuates African dependency and poverty; the restriction of the movement of African peoples; 
and the inescapable racism used to justify the launch of the transatlantic slave trade as the basis 
of capitalism. It is imperative, then, that Africans refrain from participating in their own 
disadvantaging. 
In this paper, I look at how South African newspapers covered xenophobic violence during 
major outbursts between 2008 and 2016. Noteworthy spikes in violence can be observed in 2008, 
2011, and 2015. An especially relevant primary source is volume 16 of the Chimurenga Chronic. 
The Chronic is an annual publication that, in 2011, published a “time travel” edition set in the 
week of May 18th to 24th, during the height of the 2008 attacks, in order to serve as “a time-
machine – which travels backwards and forwards, to place these events within a broader context” 
(Chimurenga Chronic 2011, 1). In this important edition, journalists conducted interviews with 
eyewitnesses neglected by police, in order to reconstruct and report the reality that the police 
force was complicit in whitewashing. South African hostility toward other black Africans 
suggests inauspicious implications for the future of the pan Africanist project. This is because 
xenophobia stems from an unwillingness to engage with the rest of the continent culturally, 
socially, and politically. This is counterproductive as such engagement is at the core of pan 
Africanism. The othering of the non-South African black is seen even at the highest levels of 
government, with President Jacob Zuma offhandedly remarking during a news conference on 
road toll fees, for example: “We can’t think like Africans in Africa generally. This is 
Johannesburg. It is not some national road in Malawi” (Aljazeera 2013). His disparaging 
comments explicitly reflect a prevalent South African sense of superiority and disdain that 
elevates South Africa above the rest of the continent. Social consciousness is also embedded 
with exclusive language that reflects the sentiment that Africa is a foreign space. South African 
slang contains derogatory terms for migrants that are country specific for most nationalities – 
“Koolie” for Indian, “Paki” for Pakistani, and “M’china” for Chinese, for example – but one 
term is used for all black, non-South African Africans: kwerekwere. Used to mock this group, 
this word was originally derived from the languages spoken by this group that, according to 
South Africans, were “unintelligible” (Warner and Finchilescu 2003, 38). The use of one 
singular word for other Africans represents the perception that the rest of the continent is a 
monolith devoid of idiosyncrasy and inherent value, and therefore not worthy of being learned 
about and engaged with. Overall, lack of interest in and constructive engagement with the rest of 
the continent, including the conditions that migrants are coming from, facilitates fallacious 
reasoning surrounding what cohabitation can mean for all. Unfortunately, this gives rise to 
hostility at best, and hate-fuelled violence at worst. 
 
The History of South Africa as an African Melting Pot 
Labor migrations have led to a diverse urban population in South Africa. The gold and diamond 
rushes of the nineteenth century, for example, necessitated a large influx of laborers from all 
over Africa to capitalize on the mineral finds that would become the cornerstone of the South 
African economy. As well as from other parts of the country, people flocked from Mozambique, 
Malawi, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Namibia as unskilled laborers. When mining moved from 
being primarily open cast to underground, a more specialized and skilled labor force was 
required; thus, mine owners moved men more permanently to mine sites by building them semi-
permanent, dorm-style dwellings called hostels (Wentzel and Tlabela 2006, 74). This separated 
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families and more concretely changed the makeup of the South African working class. During 
the period of 1890 to 1899, when Johannesburg’s gold industry was rapidly expanding, the 
migrant population at these mines grew from approximately 14,000 to 97,000 (Skinner 2015, 
73). 
Particularly within the Southern African Development Community, South Africa had liberal 
agreements when it came to the free movement of people for work. Still, “one of the main 
characteristics of the migrant labour system was that foreign workers had traditionally been 
denied permanent rights to work or take up residence in South Africa, regardless of the overall 
length of their employment under succeeding contracts, or their established familial connections 
or social ties” (Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner 2015, 76). Black South African citizens themselves 
suffered from being cast as the ‘other’ in the country of their birth through the white settler 
regime’s influx controls and pass laws that were put in place to keep them and their families out 
of urban areas, while still exploiting their cheap labor (which they were then taxed on without 
representation). Also, the social and economic costs a state usually has to bear to sustain a 
productive workforce were outsourced, in that migrants could not stay and utilize public goods in 
their areas of work (Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner 2015, 77). 
Another major source of pre-1994 migration was African refugees fleeing war, repressive 
regimes, and/or postcolonial power struggles. People from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Angola, and Mozambique are some examples. The Mozambican civil war coincided with 
drought and famine in the country, causing many to flee to South Africa amongst other places 
(Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner 2015, 81). Even then, a lack of solidarity with the black non-
African was apparent at the state level as Mozambican refugees were refused recognition, in 
some cases, by denying them assistance. This was until 1996, when the government signed and 
ratified the United Nations Convention on Refugees and the Organization of African Unity 
Convention regarding the protection and treatment of asylum seekers and refugees. This was a 
step in the right direction, as it required the state to adhere to international guidelines on 
accepting and providing for those eligible for asylum-seeker and refugee status (Handmaker, de 
la Hunt, and Klaaren 2008, 1). 
 
The Catch-22 of the Move to South Africa 
Northcote and Dodson state that, in the contemporary era, while some Africans from outside of 
South Africa find employment in the formal sector, most earn their livelihoods from insecure, 
informal work as casual laborers (2015, 146). When other Africans move to South Africa to 
work, the informal sector is easier to break into than the formal one. Starting or working in a 
small, unregistered business allows one to bypass legal regulations and run on low launch and 
operational costs. Moreover, success is a function of how much initiative and street smarts 
migrants display, rather than of the cooperation of the Departments of Labour or Home Affairs, 
which are responsible for work permits, asylum-seeker status, and refugee visas. Non-skilled 
migrants, or those who cannot enter the formal sector, can find work on construction sites, as 
domestic workers, or as traders or artisans who sell goods and services, either as itinerate 
hawkers or through small businesses called spaza shops. Spaza shops are small convenience 
stores located in low income communities that sell necessary household items in affordable 
quantities. For example, if a family cannot afford to buy eggs, milk, and bread in the full-sized 
quantities available at the supermarket, they can buy a single egg, one liter of milk, and a half 
loaf of bread to fulfill their daily needs while they continue to attempt to make ends meet. 
Perceived disparities in the success of migrant owner versus South African-owned spaza shops 
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manifest in xenophobic behaviors within the already prevalent crime culture of South Africa, in 
the sense that attacks on migrant shop owners can be more violent and frequent. In 2013, 
Northcote and Dodson interviewed a series of spaza shop owners. One Somali interviewee 
commented: “As for safety, it is very bad in South Africa for refugees, especially for Somalians. 
If they see [a] Somalian, they think they’ve got money. But money is very difficult – if you sell 
sweets and what-what, and small groceries, if you sell that stuff, maybe, plus minus, you can get 
more than R2,000 or R3,000 per month… The people, they see this money and they think that 
you’ve got a lot of money” (Northcote and Dodson 2015, 159). Refugees and registered asylum 
seekers are legally permitted to work in the formal sector, but anti-migrant sentiment, 
exacerbated by the prevalence of fake documents, can act as an invisible barrier to entry (Landau 
and Segatti 2009, 54). Migrants also often perform casual labor, which is defined as “informal 
work that is performed for an employer without the rights associated with formal employment, 
such as sick leave, paid leave, or a formal contract” (Devey et al. 2006, as quoted in Northcote 
and Dodson 2015, 147). Census data reflects that unemployment rates are lower in African 
migrant communities in South Africa than they are amongst South Africans. Compared to 31 
percent of South Africans, 18 percent of Zimbabweans, 24 percent of Mozambicans, and 30 
percent of Basotho who live in the country are unemployed (Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner 2015, 
4). Even in this informal sector, the communities in which migrants operate, as well as the South 
African government itself in some regards, propagate the stereotypes of non-South Africans as 
unworthy of the space, market share, and commercial success the country affords them. These 
stereotypical beliefs fall into three broad categories: (1) since many migrant businesses operate 
parallel to legal and regulatory frameworks, they act as parasites on the economy without 
formally contributing to it in the form of taxes; (2) migrants are taking jobs away from South 
Africans, a widespread populist belief observed also in the United States against Mexicans and 
South Americans, as well as in the United Kingdom, where “Put Britain First” is seen on 
Brexiteer merchandise and publications; and (3) migrant business practices and owners are more 
often than not nefarious. Stereotypes include the Nigerian drug dealer and brothel owner, the 
stingy and entitled Pakistani shop owner, and the stealing Zimbabwean domestic worker (Crush, 
Chikanda, and Skinner 2015, 3). Public consciousness surrounding South Africans is 
summarized as follows by Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner: 
A central premise of the hostility towards “foreigners” in South Africa is that they “steal” 
jobs from South Africans. A survey in 2010 found that 60 per cent of South Africans believe 
that migrants take jobs and only 27 per cent that they create them. Furthermore, nearly 60 per 
cent felt that reasons for the xenophobic violence of 2008 included that migrants take jobs 
from South Africans and that they do not belong in the country. At the same time, only 16 
per cent of South Africans claimed that they had personally been denied a job because it was 
given to a foreign national. (2015, 6) 
On the other hand, studies on the casual labor market in Cape Town in 2012 found that, when 
picking up day laborers who were advertising their trades (such as painters or carpenters) on the 
roadside, people tended to favor foreign nationals based on their higher English proficiency and 
the mentality that they tend to work harder (Northcote and Dodson 2015, 147). 
Fatoki conducted a case study attempting to measure if a difference existed between the 
entrepreneurial tendencies of migrant informal business owners and those of South Africans. The 
study found that migrant entrepreneurial practices are characterized as exhibiting “competitive 
intelligence,” a quality that includes, for example: scoping out the prices at which goods and 
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services are being traded by local competitors; being willing to offer a greater range of products 
(stocked from South Africa and their home countries); keeping their stores open for longer hours; 
and reducing operational costs by working with other migrant business owners to buy 
collectively and harvest the benefits of bulk prices or the divided cost of transportation (Fatoki 
2013, 90–92). All of this enables migrant-owned businesses to undercut prices advertised by 
South African informal traders and secure a greater proportion of customers; this is negatively 
interpreted by local traders and their families and communities as “stealing” market share. 
The hostile attitudes these biases foster come not only from ordinary citizens who, ironically, 
buy and use goods and services offered to them by the migrant community because of the on-
average lower prices, the cause of which will be addressed shortly, but also from South African 
police officials who exhibit and license xenophobia on the very streets where they are paid to 
maintain order. An article in the Chimurenga Chronic titled “The Warm Up” that explored the 
beginnings of the 2008 spike, quotes a policeman inciting mob action by saying, “Sort these 
people out, we also don’t want them here” to an already riled up mob in Atteridgeville (Sosibo 
2011, 2). An example of members of the police tainting the integrity of the force is 2014’s 
“Operation Hardstick,” during which over six hundred small, informal businesses owned by 
foreign Africans, some of whom were refugees, were fined, expelled from their operating sites, 
and had their owners detained and/or verbally abused by Limpopo province police. The Supreme 
Court ultimately ruled the operation was highly discriminatory and unconstitutional, seeing as 
what was supposed to be a blanket informal sector regulating operation was selectively enforced 
to only target foreign Africans. An affidavit presented in the case of the Somali Association of 
South Africa and Others versus the Limpopo Department of Economic Development, 
Environment and Tourism stated that the South African police force’s behavior, “tell[s] a story of 
the most naked form of xenophobic discrimination and of the utter desperation experienced by 
the victims of that discrimination” (SAFLII 2014). The notion of desperation being exploited in 
this instance is particularly significant, as one could deduce that high levels of desperation 
caused by unemployment and coupled with a lack of service delivery within the South African 
population itself is a major cause of xenophobia. The irony of the solidarity that should come 
from experiencing the same struggle instead manifesting as fierce, violent competitiveness is 
tragic and favors those with the home ground advantage. A repeat incident was Johannesburg 
Metro Police’s Operation Clean Sweep in 2013, which affected between five thousand and six 
thousand traders (Nxumalo and Tolsi 2013). In an interview with Ungulani Ba Ka Khosa, a 
celebrated Mozambican novelist, a fellow Mozambican reflected on how disappointed he was to 
learn during the 2008 attacks that he was mistaken about how well he had assimilated into South 
Africa, a place he had called home for ten years. The interviewed Mozambican remarked: 
I assumed myself to be Matsolo [a Sotho sounding South Africanization of his Mozambican 
last name, Matola]… But they, in truth, never did accept me. When caught by the whirlwind 
of hate, all they saw [were] foreigners. To all of those, they directed the hatred they felt for 
their own miserable lives. It was tough. And even tougher was when we saw the images of 
Ernesto Nhamuave burning alive. They wrote “Burning Man”, “Burning Nation”. But what 
was burning away wasn’t only South Africa, but also the world; the world that burns with 
misery and hate. (Ba Ka Khosa 2013) 
“Burning Man” refers to the unequivocal low point of the 2008 violence, when Ernesto Alfabeto 
Nhamuave, a Mozambican national, was burned alive in front of a giant mob in Ramaphosa, an 
informal settlement east of Johannesburg. 
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It is not difficult to understand why non-South African blacks live in a state of fear that ebbs 
and flows according to the changing, yet somewhat regular, currents of violent xenophobic flare-
ups that go unaddressed. Rather than tackling roots as well as symptoms, periods of high 
violence and tension are simply waited out until they subside, leaving all demographics 
uncomfortable and nursing subdued resentment until the next violent eruption. Fear amongst the 
migrant community manifests across the domestic, social, and professional spheres. Somali shop 
owners have reported being afraid to invest in immovable property out of fear that they will have 
to flee and abandon it in the foreseeable future. They also sell their goods from behind thick, 
clear plastic windows with burglar bars and small windows through which only hands holding 
groceries and money can fit, in order to make it as difficult as possible for outsiders to enter the 
small, contained stall to vandalize and loot or hurt the owner. South African police officials are 
also guilty of looting and extortion (Battersby and Peyton 2014, 161). Bribes are elicited by 
police and given by shop owners to secure some level of protection or to ensure simply being left 
alone. The transnational movements of migrant informal entrepreneurs mean that this group is 
particularly vulnerable to this level of corruption since there are more formal, systematized 
checkpoints that facilitate police demanding payments. Interviews with those who frequently 
move across borders have revealed that, as of January 2016, such payments are an average of 
ZAR 2,000 and ZAR 5,000 ($147.20 and $368.01 USD, respectively). That is a sizeable chunk 
of capital that could go toward stock or operational costs being lost, for example, at the 
Beitbridge border post with Zimbabwe, where “84 per cent of traders had goods valued between 
ZAR1,000 and ZAR5,000” (Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner, 2015, 12). Another example of 
police corruption involves Moses Mhlangu, a Mozambican artisan who had lived in South Africa 
for twenty-seven years and been a citizen for five years by 2008. Mhlangu reported to the 
Chimurenga newspaper, while on the run from his home in Atteridgeville, that a policeman had 
warned him of imminent violence, saying that, for a fee, Mhlangu could buy private police 
protection for himself and his business. Although Mhlangu did not pay this bribe, he reported 
that even those who did pay had their spaza shop vandalized (Sosibo 2011, 3). 
Crush, Chikanda, and Skinner (2015) also laud this transnational trade as a form of low-level 
globalization, facilitated through small amounts of capital and informal transactions carried out 
in businesses that survive by bootstrapping, since many of them are rendered ineligible for 
business or personal loans from formal South African financial institutions. 
 
Tiers of Exclusion 
As mentioned, there are levels to xenophobic exclusion. Crush and Ramachandaran (2015, 28) 
outline four particular avenues of exclusion as: (1) the protectionist position of the South African 
state when it comes to regulating small to medium enterprises, including informal businesses, 
that disadvantages and restricts migrant business activity; (2) the bribe seeking of police 
officials, who solicit payment from migrant entrepreneurs or workers in exchange for protection 
from xenophobically motivated raids or document checks or violence from South Africans in 
their community; (3) migrant business owners being intimidated or physically scared out of 
certain areas to make space for natives; and (4) grassroots discrimination on individual and 
community levels. Migrants and their businesses are attacked violently, with many individuals 
being scared into moving once again or even killed. Table 1, below, shows recorded xenophobic 
incidents of collective violence. There is a trend of overall increase in violent incidences, with an 
anomalous spike in 2010 when the FIFA World Cup was hosted in South Africa. The most 
violent attacks of 2008 will be addressed separately due to their severity and significance. 
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Table 1 
Number of Recorded Xenophobic Incidents in South Africa Per Year 
Year No. of incidents Percentage 
Pre-2005 9 4 
2005 4 2 
2006 9 4 
2007 9 4 
2008* 19 8 
2009 17 7 
2010 46 20 
2011 22 10 
2012 25 11 
2013 36 16 
2014 (to end-August) 32 14 
Total 228 100 
* Excluding May 2008 attacks   
Source: Crush and Ramachandaran 2015, 35. 
 
Despite these figures, the South African government has at times chosen to adopt a denialist 
stance, as is the case with many nationalist and populist movements. In response to online press 
coverage of anti-migrant fueled violence in Port Elizabeth (Patel and Essa 2013, in Crush and 
Ramachandaran 2015, 48), one governmental spokesperson made the assertion that the media 
“painted an incorrect picture of…South Africa [that] was far from reality [, saying that] South 
Africa allows and welcomes foreign nationals” and has “strived to build a society based on the 
values of unity and togetherness” (Williams 2013, as quoted in Crush and Ramachandaran 2015, 
48). A widely employed scapegoat statement was that of opportunistic criminals simply doing 
what they have always done rather than of South Africans being Afro-phobic. The spokesperson 
concluded: “The looting, displacement and killing of foreign nationals in South Africa should not 
be viewed as xenophobic attacks, but opportunistic criminal acts [emphasis ours] that have the 
potential to undermine the unity and cohesiveness of our communities” (Hirsi 2013, as quoted in 
Crush and Ramachandaran 2015, 48). In 2013, after a large number of attacks on migrant owned 
shops in Port Elizabeth, the provincial police remarked that the “motive” for the violence should 
not be viewed as “xenophobic in nature, but a criminal element that has seized an opportunity 
[emphasis ours]” (Sapa 2013, as quoted in Crush and Ramachandaran 2015, 49). Disdain for the 
importance of correctly characterizing the source of violence is detrimental for finding lasting 
solutions. Another case in point would be the former deputy trade and industry minister 
Elizabeth Thabethe’s remark about how, “You still find many spazas with African names, but 
when you go in to buy you find your Mohammeds and most of them are not even registered” 
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(Sowetan 2013, as quoted in Crush and Ramachandaran 2015, 49). As well, ANC Secretary-
General Gwede Mantashe proclaimed at a 2014 election rally that, “if you go to Soweto, corner 
shops have been taken over by foreigners. We must do something about it” (Ginindza 2014, as 
quoted in Crush and Ramachandaran 2015, 50). This latter sentiment from a high ranking 
member of the political party that possesses the greatest cultural capital is frightening. It has the 
power not only to validate xenophobia, but also to impede efforts to undo discriminatory 
mentalities. 
 
The Role of Gender in Exclusion 
The informal sector that many migrants participate in – either as a stepping stone to the formal 
sector or as a perpetual means of survival – offers differing opportunities to men and women. 
These differences occur due to prevailing, highly segregated, and traditionally held views on 
what work is appropriate for what gender; safety concerns that women have that men do not that 
discourage them from doing work that involves working and/or commuting alone at night; and, 
the fact that existing gender disparities propagate themselves. The major disparity in the effect 
gender has on migrants’ ability to support and advance themselves is the connectedness to the 
greater working community afforded to males over females (Blaauw, Pretorius, Schoeman, and 
Schenck 2012, 1339). Northcote and Dodson (2015) have also observed that gender can also 
have an effect on the extent to which communities made up of migrants and South Africans alike 
lend a helping hand to those in need. They cite a series of interviews in which a single father 
from Ghana, who was struggling to find work and thus afford to support himself and his 
daughter, was allowed to live rent free in the home of a Congolese woman in Cape Town, so that 
he could take care of his daughter’s needs. By contrast, a young, single mother from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reported garnering less sympathy and support, as her 
youth and single-motherhood led people to assume negative stereotypes about her, including that 
she was promiscuous. Such perceptions occur as a result of a lack of contextualization of the 
landscape of rape as a weapon of war in the DRC, which has produced scores of children with 
single mothers who have needed to migrate to places such as South Africa.  
In terms of the type of work available, for women, work is isolating and often lacks 
opportunities to connect with others. The work available to men, on the other hand, is often 
along the lines of construction work on teams, where they can network with other workers, form 
social connections, practice speaking the local language, and learn where to find more similar 
work. Generally, in their research, Northcote and Dodson noted a “clear gender bias in how 
success is attained. In contrast to the casual jobs that the men were able to secure, work as a 
domestic laborer was comparatively socially isolating for the women involved. Male participants 
commonly worked as part of a team, such as on a construction site, thereby allowing them to 
build their language skills and open up a web of possible social and business connections. 
Domestic labor, such as washing dishes, doing laundry and cleaning homes, does not offer these 
same possibilities” to women (Northcote and Dodson 2015, 150). 
 
Legal Exclusion 
Christian Rogerson (2015) explains that the South African government has made concerted 
efforts to support small to medium enterprises in the informal sector through various initiatives 
of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the creation of a specialized Ministry for 
small business announced in 2014. The importance of an entire dedicated ministry became 
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apparent when it was found that, in South Africa, up to 56 percent of the GDP is generated by 
small to medium enterprises. One of the DTI’s chief initiatives was to develop the Informal 
Business and Chamber Support, the mandate of which is to harvest the “vital importance of the 
informal business sector in broadening economic participation and creating decent employment” 
(Rogerson 2015, 232). In particular, the National Informal Business Development Strategy 
(NIBDS) was created to combat the perpetual survivalist culture that many informal sector 
workers and entrepreneurs were failing to graduate from to make it into secure income 
generating businesses. NIBDS’s goal is to craft “an enabling policy, regulatory, and 
programming environment promoting and supporting a developmental continuum for the 
graduation of Informal Businesses into the mainstream of the formal economy,” and especially, 
to place “particular focus on uplifting and empowering disadvantaged informal businesses of 
vulnerable groups like women, youth and disabled persons” (Rogerson 2015, 233). The Ministry 
will focus initiatives to foster and up-skill entrepreneurs, whereas the Department will provide 
financial and legal support to qualifying enterprises. The notion of “qualifying” enterprises here 
is an important one because it implicitly excludes migrant entrepreneurs, who, as discussed 
earlier, are at the foundation of the South African economy and continue to be a major source of 
growth at all levels. Although people with refugee and asylum-seeker status living and working 
in the country are legally permitted to work, the NIBDS and other governmental provisions are 
awarded on the basis of South African citizenship, and carry the explicit objective to increase 
South African labourers’ overall competitiveness in the domestic context (Rogerson 2015, 239). 
Seeing as how the NIBDS is a national government initiative, it goes without saying that it was 
designed to benefit the South African people. Thus, the specific goal to make South African 
informal sector workers more competitive than their non-South African counterparts is especially 
exclusionary, and indeed demonstrates an othering of the non-South African across spheres of 
identity: national, social, and ethnic. Official NIBDS documentation has consistently portrayed 
non-South Africans in a negative light, and as a threat. The strategy document reads: “there are 
no regulatory restrictions in controlling the influx of foreigners” and there is “no synergy 
between the DTI and Home Affairs in devising strategies and policies to control foreign business 
activities” (Rogerson 2015, 239). With regard to the Refugee Status Act of 1998, the document 
notes that the Act, “is still perceived by [the] majority [of] citizens to be too lenient to 
foreigners[,] giving them an unfair advantage over nationals” (Rogerson 2015, 239–40). 
Rogerson also observes that sections of the document selectively cite instances in Ghanaian, 
Indian, and Malaysian policy, in which foreign nationals are prevented from participating in 
segments of their informal economies and are banned from trading in certain areas (2015, 240). 
Rogerson argues that when the Department of Trade and Industry writes about the importance of 
cracking down on the trade of counterfeit goods, it is an indirect attack on migrant traders as they 
are often associated with those sales. 
A major component of the push for greater regulation of the informal sector, ostensibly to 
strengthen it, is the registering of businesses (Holmes 2013). Registered businesses can avail 
themselves of assistance from the government in the form of small business loans and business 
development support structures (e.g., skills training and access to technology) (Rogerson 2015, 
233–34). However, during attempts to pass the licensing rule that would operationalize 
registering informal businesses, the Department of Home Affairs requested that “foreigners 
whose status is not confirmed…should not be granted licences” (DTI 2014). In addition, the 
municipal government branches responsible for implementing licensing regulations made a call 
for community-based organizations to assist with implementation. Jonathan Crush has noted that 
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this, “sounds suspiciously like an attempt to get South Africans on board to assist the police in 
identifying and rooting out foreign traders,” and argued that the licensing debacle is attempting 
to “make it so difficult for non-citizens to operate small businesses in the country that they will 
go home” (Crush 2013, as quoted in Rogerson 2015, 240–1). 
While some South Africans have exhibited highly xenophobic behavior, particularly in the 
significantly violent eruptions of 2008 and 2015, others have banded together, citing very 
logical, pragmatic reasons as to why they are open to living, working, and trading with other 
Africans. During the same series of xenophobic attacks, a female-led anti-xenophobic coalition 
gave interviews to the BBC. The women’s comments included: “They are the only shops from 
where we can buy things cheaply. The local businessmen are greedy and jealous”; “Even when [I 
am] short of R1, they give me the bread and tell me I can pay next time”; and, “When it is the 
middle of the month, they give me groceries and tell me I can pay them when I get my pension. 
They don’t even take my number or address, that is how much they trust us” (BBC News 2011). 
The contrast can be seen between this and another interview from 2011, when leaders from the 
community group that called itself the Greater Gauteng Business Forum remarked: “We want 
them [Somali spaza shop owners] to leave. Before, we said let them remain here because they are 
also human beings and they’re supposed to stay somewhere. Now we’re saying: Just close your 
shops and leave the area. We don’t like them, we don’t want them to be around townships any 
more. The government is supposed to take them to a camp somewhere, not allow them to come 
inside our townships” (Misago and Wilhelm-Solomon 2011). Here, South Africans demonstrate 
empathy towards the cause of the refugee, but not the migrant. The perceived threat arises when 
people feel that their space is being permanently infringed upon. 
 
Africa Hosts Itself 
Another way to look at the notion of one group or nationality claiming particular spaces is that it 
is a hypocritical practice, particularly in the case of Africans. Contrary to popular belief, it has 
been found that most Africans migrate for family, work, or study, rather than as a result of 
having to flee from poverty or socio-political strife, although these are also significant 
contributors (Flahaux and De Haas 2016, 3). Only 14 percent of Africans leaving the continent 
are doing so as refugees or under refugee-like circumstances, which means that 86 percent are 
driven by ordinary social processes, such as moving to a new place for work, to live with a 
partner/spouse, or for education (Bakewell and Bonfiglio 2013, 4). Thus, I would argue that hope 
for the future of pan Africanism is twofold: first, Africa deserves credit for, in large part, hosting 
itself. While most western media outlets routinely broadcast that Europe is struggling with its 
refugee crisis, out of the top ten refugee-hosting countries, none are European, but five are 
African. In order of the number of refugees hosted, they are Ethiopia (736,000), Kenya 
(554,000), Uganda (477,000), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (383,000), and Chad 
(370,000) (UNHRC 2016). Schoumaker et al. have noted that most African migrations are not 
directed toward Europe, but toward other African countries, and also to the Gulf countries and 
the Americas (2015, as quoted in Flahaux and De Haas 2016, 3). While around 1.3 million 
refugees sought asylum in the European Union over the past year, 4.4 million did so in sub-
Saharan Africa. Additionally, the continent holds 19.5 million “people of concern” to the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (Hasan 2016). That point brings us to the second point of this 
paper surrounding the future of the pan Africanist project: the continent needs to get its own 
house in order. Countries on the continent need to work smarter as well as harder on creating 
conditions in which their citizens have no urgent incentive to emigrate, but rather, can participate 
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in a productive and growing society that attracts other investment. According to Zelinsky’s 
Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition, “processes of modernisation and economic development 
have historically coincided with increasing rural-to-urban migration followed by a subsequent 
increase in emigration. When societies become wealthy emigration decreases and immigration 
increases, leading to a mobility or migration transition, in which countries gradually transform 
from countries of net emigration into countries of net immigration” (Flahaux and De Haas 2016, 
17). South Africa is a useful case study in this regard. While the inflow of other Africans signals 
its attractiveness as a relatively prosperous economy, the tension lies in that not being the 
experience of low income South Africans themselves, who find themselves not wanting to 
“share” what to them is an already sparse landscape of opportunity. 
 
Conclusion 
Central to dismantling xenophobia in the South African consciousness and in practice, from 
communities to all levels of government, is deconstructing the language surrounding “us” and 
“them.” Small Business Development Minister Lindiwe Zulu gave an address in 2014 that 
consistently referred to “foreigners” and South Africans as two distinct groups in direct 
competition for customers, transactions, and physical space. In reference to the perceived greater 
rates of success of migrant spaza shop owners, she said: “They must ask themselves how can 
they [foreigners] be successful in the same communities [where] others [locals] claim they can’t 
succeed…How are they able to make it when our people can’t. It is because they know business. 
It is in their blood” (Rogerson 2015, 244). This evokes colonial era divide-and-conquer 
ideologies, in which a group would be made out to be inherently more adept at something, with 
little to no sense of contextualizing the accurate source of disparities in terms of successfulness. 
One example is the appointment of the Tutsi in Rwanda as the collaborating class, who were 
privileged over the Hutu and Twa on the basis of physical features that more closely resembled 
European ones, such as longer, thinner noses and high cheekbones.  
With the rest of the world exhibiting varied forms of Afrophobia by imposing obstacles to 
traveling, working, and settling abroad, it is highly unnecessary for Africans to impose the same 
exclusion amongst themselves. Such exclusion is particularly troubling as it signals bad news for 
the future of pan Africanism. Secession is a phenomenon not new to the African continent: 
Eritrea, attempts at founding the Republic of Biafra, Somaliland, Western Sahara, and, most 
recently, South Sudan are prominent examples. The erection of new borders on the continent that 
already possesses the most is surely a move away from integration and toward a continental 
culture of nationalism, populism, and othering. Populism is not unique to Africa, however, as 
evidenced by the election of the 45th United States president, Donald Trump, the vote to exit the 
European Union and Theresa May’s unelected prime ministership, and the possibility of a Le 
Pen presidency in France. Migration is as human as procreation – we have been doing both since 
the origin of our species. Poet Teju Cole captures this sentiment in his poem writing: 
Moving for economic benefit is itself a matter of life and death. Because money is the 
universal language, and to be deprived of it is to be deprived of a voice while everyone else 
is shouting. Sometimes the gun aimed at your head is grinding poverty, or endless shabby 
struggle, or soul crushing tedium. 
Did all sixteen of your great great grandparents live, work, and die in the same town where 
you now live? If no, then you’re a child of migrants. 
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“OK, but where do we draw the line?” is a question you create in your head to distract you 
from your human duty to the other. If the line had been drawn in front of you instead of 
behind, you wouldn’t even be here now, wherever here might be. (Cole 2015) 
Fearful reactions to the free movement of people in search of a better life go against the grain 
of the natural progression of human development. This is not to say that unregulated movement 
is the solution, as there are very real threats involved in that as well. Terrorism, economic strain, 
and disease are issues all citizens of the world are concerned about, yet these too can be powerful 
notions that can incentivize cooperation rather than isolation and exclusion. In the context of 
Africa, the continent is too pertinent an example of how divide-and-conquer tactics weaken the 
social, political, and economic strength of states and societies. The South African government 
and people need to take responsibility for the country’s privileged position as the continent’s 
second largest economy. South Africa needs to devise comprehensive strategies to enable itself 
to play a practical and sustainable role in the uplifting of Africa’s people. As the world moves 
toward nationalism and populism, we must continually and critically reflect on the roots of this 
movement and dissect the fear and discrimination that drives it, in order to move away from a 
place in which nationality dictates the extent of one’s entitlement to dignity and humanity. 
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